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COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF UNINSURED
MOTORIST ACCIDENTS
Uninsured motorist insurance permits innocent policyholders in-
demnfication from their own comranies when their automobile
is struck by a negligent uninsured driver. Unfortunately, many
consumers are unaware of the importance of carrying adequate
amounts of coverage. All too often, consumers are caught with
a minimum of coverage that indemnifies themfor only afraction
of the cost of their injuries. In this article the author examines
the law surrounding uninsured motorist insurance and suggests
ways for states and insurance companies to help assure more
complete compensation to these innocent victims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the first automobile liability policy was issued in 1898,' soci-
ety has attempted to resolve the problems created by financially irre-
sponsible motorists who have been unable to adequately compensate
victims of their negligence. 2 As one of several solutions,3 most states
have enacted uninsured motorist (UM) statutes.4 UM insurance, how-
l. Plummer, The UncompensatedAutomobile Accident Victim, 1956 INs. L.J. 459, 463
[hereinafter cited as Plummer].
2. A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 1.1, at 3-4 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WIDISS].
3. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 1. 1, at 4. Although two other solutions to the uninsured
motorist (UM) problem, compulsory insurance laws and unsatisfied claim and
judgment funds, are briefly discussed in the background section of this article, see
infra notes 7-23 and accompanying text, this article will primarily focus on UM
coverage. For a thorough discussion of compulsory insurance laws see 6B J.A.
APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4299-4301 (rev.
Buckley ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; and for unsatisfied claim and
judgment funds see 8D APPLEMAN, supra, §§ 5144-5144.95 (1981).
4. States either require UM coverage to be included in all automobile liability poli-
cies or require UM coverage to be offered but allow the insured the option to
reject it. ALA. CODE § 32-7-23 (1975) (optional); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440(3)
(Supp. 1981) (optional); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 66-4003 (1980) (optional); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp.
1982) (optional); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-319 (1973) (optional); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-175(c) (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp.
1980) (optional); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (West Supp. 1982) (optional); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-7-11 (1982) (optional); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 431-448 (1976) (op-
tional); IDAHO CODE § 41-2502 (1977) (optional); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (optional); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-2 (Bums Supp.
1982) (optional); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A. 1 (West Supp. 1982) (optional); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (1981) (optional); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.20-020 (Bald-
win 1981) (optional); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406(D) (West 1978 & Supp.
1983) (optional); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902 (1974 & Supp. 1982); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175,
§ I 13L (West 1972 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.49(4) (West Supp.
1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (Supp. 1982) (optional); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 379.203 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-23-201 (1981) (optional);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-509.01 (1978) (optional); NEV. REV. STAT. § 690B.020
(1981) (optional); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268:15-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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ever, has not always provided sufficient protection. Insurance compa-
nies usually issue the coverage in the often insufficient5 statutorily
required minimum.6 Additionally, insurance policies, some with state
approval, normally prohibit the victim from stacking UM benefits
under more than one applicable policy. This comment addresses the
limitations on the effectiveness of UM insurance, discusses the issue of
stacking, and suggests further refinements that may aid in providing
adequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents caused by
negligent uninsured motorists.
II. BACKGROUND
A. In General
States have enacted a wide variety of statutory remedies to correct
the problem of inadequate compensation to victims of uninsured mo-
torist accidents, providing for compulsory automobile insurance, 7 un-
satisfied claim and judgment funds,8 and UM coverage.9 These
remedial measures are intended to be complementary - when one is
inapplicable another should compensate the injured party."°
§ 17:28-1.1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (1978) (op-
tional); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1672-a (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 1979) (optional); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-02-42 to -44
(1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1983) (optional); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636 (West Supp. 1982) (optional); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 743.789 to .792 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Purdon 1971); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (Supp. 1982) (optional); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-830 (Law. Co-
op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 56-7-1201 (1980) (optional); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981) (op-
tional); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-21.1 (1981) (optional); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,§ 941 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1982) (optional); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 48.22.030 (Supp. 1982) (optional); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1982)
(optional); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 31-10-101 to -104 (1977) (optional). Michigan is the only state with no UM
statute. It was repealed when that state enacted no-fault insurance laws. Simi-
larly, Washington, D.C. has passed no-fault insurance laws, to become effective
on or about Aug. 1, 1983.
5. Comment, Twenty-Five Years of Uninsured Motorist Coverage: A Silver Anniver-
sary Cloud with a Tarnished Lining, 14 IND. L. REV. 671, 674-75 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Comment].
6. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 1.13 (Supp. 1981).
7. Plummer, supra note 1, at 4 60-61;see, e.g., MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 17-101 to
-104 (1977 & Supp. 1982). Maryland requires a motorist to provide security in the
form of a vehicle liability policy before a car can be registered. Id § 17-104.
8. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTO LIABILITY INSURANCE § 23.02, at 23-1 to -3 (1981). Several
states have created unsatisfied claim and judgment funds. See, e.g., MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 243 (1979 & Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.1101
to .1133 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982);
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 600-626 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 39-17-01 to -10 (1980).
9. See supra note 4.
10. See Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage Laws: The Problem of the Underinsured
Motorist, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 541, 541-42 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note].
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Compulsory automobile insurance laws, requiring every vehicle
registered in the state to carry liability insurance, now exist in almost
half of the states"' but are inadequate in several respects. First, the
motorist may drive without registering his car and while he has no in-
surance. 2 Second, an irresponsible motorist may acquire insurance
and then permit it to lapse. 3 Finally, a negligent driver may have
insurance at the time of the accident, but the insurer may deny its lia-
bility due to limitations in the policy.' 4
Unsatisfied claim and judgment funds, originating in Canada, 5
are now employed by several states in this country.' 6 States maintain
the funds' 7 and utilize them to reimburse those who have an unsatisfied
claim against a negligent motorist.' 8 However, recovery under these
funds is limited."' For example, in Maryland the claim cannot be cov-
ered by any policy of motor vehicle liability insurance and notice of
intent to make a claim against the fund must be filed within 180 days of
the accident.2" Also, depending on the type of accident from which the
11. 6B APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4299, at 300-01 (rev. Buckley ed. 1979).
12. Note, supra note 10, at 541-42.
13. Id at 541. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-106 (1977 & Supp. 1982) for proce-
dures the insurance company and Motor Vehicle Administration must follow
upon lapse of any liability insurance policy.
14. Note, supra note 10, at 541. For example, the policy may expressly require any
summons, notice, demand or other process received by the insured to be for-
warded immediately to the company. Id. at 541 n.5. Failure to do so would ab-
solve the company of liability. Id.
Even if the negligent driver is insured, under the fault system of accident
reparations small claimants are often overpaid while large claimants are un-
derpaid. A United States Department of Transportation study in 1971 showed
that about 45% of those seriously injured in auto accidents got absolutely nothing
from automobile liability insurance. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND
REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE 4 (1971) (citing UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COM-
PENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES (March 1971)).
15. Plummer, supra note 1, at 462-63.
16. See supra note 8.
17. See 8D APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5144.15, at 290-93 (1981); see also Allied
American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607,
611-12, 150 A.2d 421, 425 (1959).
In 1972 Maryland amended its Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund stat-
ute, changing the fund's name to Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF)
and giving it the added function of insuring drivers unable to obtain private insur-
ance. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 726 n.3, 436 A.2d 465,
468-69 n.3 (1981); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243 (1979 & Supp. 1982).
18. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243A (1979 & Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:6-64 (West 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-17-03 (1980).
19. 8D APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5144.15, at 291-92 (1981). In Maryland, despite
MAIF's limitations, recovery can be had for intentionally inflicted injuries arising
from the use of a car. Elliott v. Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co., 27 Md. App. 566, 571,
342 A.2d 319, 322 (1975) (citing Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund
Bd., 262 Md. 115, 277 A.2d 57 (1971)).
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a), (c) (1979 & Supp. 1982). However, in lieu
of notice a claimant may show he was physically incapable of giving notice, id
(c)(1); or that he gave notice within 30 days of receiving notice that an insurer had
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claim arises, numerous other preconditions must be met.2' Moreover,
the financial instability of the fund may decrease its effectiveness.
22
To compensate for the inadequacies of these remedial measures,
states began to require that UM coverage be offered in every automo-
bile insurance policy issued.23 UM insurance is an agreement between
the insured and his company that the latter will compensate him if he is
injured as the result of an uninsured motorist's negligence. 24 Its pur-
pose is to place the victim in as good a position as if he had been struck
by a motorist insured at the minimum amount required by statute.25
UM endorsements, however, are not as widely effective at assuring
compensation as one would expect. The coverage will only protect
those responsible drivers who secure liability insurance and do not re-
ject the offered UM coverage, if rejection is optional in their state. Ad-
ditionally, it is often unclear in certain cases whether a vehicle is, in
fact, uninsured so as to enable recovery under a UM policy.26 More-
over, even when UM coverage is applicable, it is often insufficient to
fully compensate the innocent party for his injuries.2 7 Consequently,
many victims of uninsured motorist accidents have attempted to stack
the coverage on more than one applicable UM policy. Stacking en-
ables the victim to receive the maximum coverage up to the amount of
his damages under the several policies. 28 The question of whether
stacking of coverages is permitted, however, has led to decisional in-
consistencies 29 because of insurance companies that attempt to limit re-
covery on more than one policy and statutes that fail to provide for full
indemnification.3 °
disclaimed on a policy of insurance, id (c)(2); or that he gave notice within 30
days of receiving notice that the defendant's insurer was insolvent. Id (c)(3).
21. Id § 243H (a)(l)-(3). For example, the victim cannot be operating an uninsured
motor vehicle owned by him, id (l)(i); or the claimant must show that he made all
reasonable efforts to ascertain the identity of the hit and run vehicle that struck
him. Id (l)(iv).
22. See Motor Club of America Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277, 284, 330 A.2d 360,
364 (1974) (New Jersey's fund was approaching insolvency because of the growing
gap between its income and the volume of claims upon it); see also Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Belcher, 83 Mich. App. 175, 180, 268 N.W.2d 335, 337 (1978), rev'don
other grounds, 409 Mich. 885, 295 N.W.2d 229 (1980).
23. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 1.11, at 15. See supra note 4 for a compilation of UM
statutes.
24. Note, supra note 10, at 542.
25. See Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 279, 475 P.2d 253, 263
(1970); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 232, 431 S.W.2d 742, 744
(1968); Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 265, 407 A.2d
315, 319 (1979).
26. Maldonado, Requiring Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio, 6 OHIo N.U.L.
REv. 534, 534-35 (1979).
27. See WIDISS, supra note 2, §§ 1.12, 3.7.
28. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
29. Comment, supra note 5, at 679-80.
30. WIDISS, supra note 2, §§ 1.12, 3.7.
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To understand UM insurance, it is necessary to collectively con-
sider the typical governing statute and UM policy provisions. UM en-
dorsements may provide for greater coverage than that mandated by
statute but they cannot provide for less. 31 Therefore, if a conflict exists
between a UM provision and the intent of the legislative enactment,
courts will find that coverage exists to the extent provided by their in-
terpretation of the statute.32
Most UM statutes share three basic elements.3 First, they require
that UM coverage be made available within the state.34 Second, the
statutes establish a minimum dollar amount of coverage that must be
provided, usually equal to the minimum liability requirements of the
financial responsibility laws.35 Third, the statutes allow the insured, at
his option, to reject UM protection.36 In addition, most UM statutes
are silent on the issue of stacking.37
UM policies have been standardized from their inception.3" In-
cluded as part of the general liability policy, most UM provisions state
that the insurance company agrees to "pay all sums which the insured 39
• . .shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
31. See 8C APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5102.25, at 475 (1981); see also Pennsylvania
Nat'l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 160-61, 416 A.2d 734, 739 (1980) (clause
denying coverage to victim injured in a nonowned uninsured vehicle less than
coverage provided by statute and was void).
32. See Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 160-61, 416 A.2d 734,
739 (1980). Additionally, because UM statutes are remedial in nature Maryland
courts feel they should be liberally construed to promote their purpose. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. MAIF, 277 Md. 602, 605, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976).
33. Note, supra note 10, at 543.
34. Id.,see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 268:15-a (1977).
35. Comment, supra note 5, at 674; see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(m) (West
Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (Supp. 1982). Contra LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:1406 D(l)(a) (West 1978) (UM coverage cannot be less than the
limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy).
36. 8C APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5073 (1981); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.727(1) (West Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West Supp. 1982).
Contra MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (Supp. 1982) (Maryland does not give
the insured the option to reject coverage). However, the Mass Transit Adminis-
tration is exempt from carrying any UM coverage. Harden v. Mass Transit Ad-
min., 277 Md. 399, 408-10, 354 A.2d 817, 822-23 (1976); see MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 7-703(c) (1977) (gives Mass Transit Administration discretion in deciding
what type of insurance is necessary).
37. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.3912], at 24-137 (1979). But
see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(a) (1979) (UM coverage cannot be stacked);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1205 (1980) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.43(1) (West
1980) (UM coverage can be stacked).
38. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.2, at 20. The 1966 STANDARD FORM will be used
throughout this comment to illustrate standard UM policy provisions. For the full
text of a UM policy see the 1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra
note 2, app. A.1, at 291-98.
39. Courts have divided over whether to extend UM coverage to insureds who are not
also named under the general liability part of the policy. See generally Comment,
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operator of an uninsured highway vehicle, because of bodily injury'
sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle."'"
In contrast to general liability insurance, which benefits any person in-
jured by the negligent policyholder, UM coverage benefits the innocent
policyholder who is injured by an uninsured motorist.42 The UM poli-
cyholder recovers UM benefits directly from his own insurer, rather
than from another's insurance company.43 Passengers in the struck ve-
hicle can also recover under the driver's UM coverage, without, as is
required in the case of liability coverage, the necessity of establishing
the insured driver's negligence. 44 In order to achieve full compensation
some jurisdictions also allow passengers additional recovery under
their own UM policies.45
Due to varying statutory and policy definitions of "uninsured," the
scope of that term has been interpreted inconsistently from one juris-
diction to another.' In the ordinary sense, an uninsured vehicle would
encompass only those automobiles with no insurance coverage or with
worthless coverage because the company insuring the vehicle has be-
come insolvent.47  Today, however, because states require different
minimum UM coverages some legislatures (including Maryland's 48)
supra note 5, at 687-90 (discussion of which definition of insured should control,
the liability or UM section).
Additionally, insurance policies refuse to extend UM coverage to policyhold-
ers injured by an uninsured motorist while in an owned but uninsured vehicle.
1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 292. This is
to encourage owners to insure their cars. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. v. Gartelinan,
288 Md. 151, 160, 416 A.2d 734, 739 (1980); cf MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 541(c)(2), 243 H(a)(l)(i) (1979 & Supp. 1982) (cannot recover UM benefits or
from MAIF if injured in owned, uninsured vehicle). Contra State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 Ala. 218, 224, 292 So. 2d 95, 100 (1974).
40. Normally, UM coverage protects the victim for personal injuries only. Davis, Un-
insured Motorist Coverage." Some Signocant Problems and Developments, 42 Mo.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1977).
Several states do allow endorsements for property damage but impose de-
ductibles. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11(a)(l)(A), (B) (1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 66-5-301(c) (Supp. 1982) (effective Jan. 1, 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-830 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201 (1980); VA. CODE § 38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1982); W. VA.
CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1982).
41. 1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 292.
42. See Note, An Examination of the Meaning and Scope of the Basis of the Uninsured
Motorist Policy Endorsement, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 320, 324-25 (1969-70).
43. Note, supra note 10, at 543.
44. Comment, supra note 5, at 677.
45. See 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.38, at 24-128 (1979).
46. Maldonado, Requiring Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio, 6 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 534, 534-35 (1979).
47. See id;see also CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (West Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3937.18(B) (Supp. 1983). The 1956 STANDARD FORM defined an unin-
sured vehicle in this way. 1956 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note
2, app. A.2, at 300.
48. Due to 1981 amendments to its UM statute, Maryland now defines an uninsured
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and most insurance policies define an uninsured vehicle as including
any vehicle that has liability insurance, but less than the minimum
amount of UM coverage required by the state in which the victim's car
is registered or principally garaged.49 This expansive definition pre-
vents the victim from being in a better position if injured by a truly
uninsured motorist rather than by a motorist insured below the statu-
tory minimum." It allows the victim to receive the limits of the negli-
gent driver's liability policy and then resort to his own UM coverage to
fully indemnify himself. Without such a definition, however, the vic-
tim is limited to recovery on the negligent driver's liability policy -
which may not afford adequate compensation. Louisiana goes even
further by also defining as uninsured any vehicle with liability limits
insufficient to cover all damages.5
In compensating passengers in the innocent driver's car, when hit
by an uninsured motorist, some jurisdictions consider the innocent
driver to be insured even if his UM coverage is insufficient to compen-
sate all his passengers.52 Other jurisdictions, however, have expanded
their definition of uninsured motorist to include these drivers, thereby
allowing passengers to recover on their own UM policies.3
vehicle as one whose ownership, maintenance or use has resulted in injury to an
insured and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all collectible poli-
cies is less than the amount of UM coverage provided to the insured. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (Supp. 1982). Contra N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268:15-
a(V) (1977). The Maryland amendments limit the UM insurer's liability to the
difference between the UM coverage provided and the liability coverage applica-
ble to the insured. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(3) (Supp. 1982).
49. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.35, at 71-73; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727(3)(b)
(West Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9.5 (Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c) (1982). Contra State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 426 A.2d 822, 827 (Del. 1981). In this case
a tort-feasor insured at the statutory minimum was insured, precluding the victim
from utilizing his higher UM limits. Id The court invited the legislature to
change the statute to prevent this anomaly. Id at 827. The 1966 STANDARD
FORM adopted this approach. 1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra
note 2, app. A. 1, at 295. See generally Widiss, The Slow Evolution of a New Auto-
mobile Coverage, Sept. 1977 TRIAL MAG. 45, 46-50 (discusses concept of underin-
sured motorist insurance as a spinoff from UM insurance).
50. Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 894, 897-98, 377
N.E.2d 62, 67 (1978).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406D(2)(b) (West 1978).
52. This view prevents passengers from recovering under their own UM coverage.
See Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal. v. Alcivar, 95 Cal. App. 3d
252, 266-67, 156 Cal. Rptr. 914, 921-22 (1979); Di Luzo v. Home Mut. Ins. Co.,
289 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Minn. 1980); Gardner v. American Ins. Co., 95 Nev. 271,
274-75, 593 P.2d 465, 467 (1979); Strunk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 90
Wash. 2d 210, 212, 580 P.2d 622, 623 (1978).
53. Portor v. Empire Fund & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 279, 475 P.2d 258, 263,
modfiedon other grounds, 106 Ariz. 345, 476 P.2d 155 (1970); Palisbo v. Hawaiian
Ins. & Guar. Co., 57 Hawaii 10, 15, 547 P.2d 1350, 1354 (1976).
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III. THE STACKING ISSUE
The issue that has generated the most controversy since the mid-
1960's is whether a victim can stack the coverage on more than one
applicable UM policy.54 Similar to liability coverage, UM endorse-
ments attempt to preclude stacking by utilizing the "other insurance"
clause," normally including excess-escape56 and pro-rata provisions.57
The excess-escape provision, operating when the insured is injured in a
nonowned vehicle, limits recovery on a second policy to the difference
between the limits of the two applicable policies.58 If the limits are the
same the insured may recover only on the primary policy.5 9 On the
other hand, when a person is injured in an owned vehicle, the pro-rata
provision apportions the insured's recovery among all available
policies.6
54. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.38, at 24-125 (1979).
55. Id § 24.39, at 24-129 to -130.
56. A typical excess-escape provision states:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway
vehicle not owned by the named insured, this insurance shall apply only
as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such
insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this
insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of lia-
bility for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance.
1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 296-97.
57. A typical pro-rata provision states:
Except as provided in the [excess-escape clause], if the insured has other
similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the
damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable lim-
its of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the com-
pany shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this
coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of
the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance.
1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 297.
58. Thus, if the innocent driver has coverage of $10,000 per person and the passenger
has coverage of $20,000, the passenger recovers a total of $20,000-$ 10,000 from
each policy.
59. See P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 25.5, at 82 (1972). In the past courts
were confronted with the issue of which policy was primarily responsible for the
damages - the driver's or the passenger's. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon
Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 341 P.2d 110, reh'g denied, 219 Or. 130, 346 P.2d 643
(1959). Today the general rule is that the driver's policy is primarily liable.
WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.60, at 210 (Supp. 1981).
60. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 25.5, at 82 (1972). For example, if the
insured owns two separate policies, each with limits of $10,000 per person, $20,000
per accident (10/20), his total recovery is $10,000 with each policy providing
$5,000.
Older insurance policies often contained a third paragraph in their other in-
surance clauses - the escape paragraph. It provided that the insurance obligation
was null and void if any other valid and collectible insurance existed, even though
the insured had paid premiums. This result was hardly what the insured had
bargained for and more modem courts reject it. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-9, at 203 (1980).
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It is important to realize, in considering whether one can stack,
that the policy terms were developed privately by the insurance indus-
try." A strict reading of the other insurance clauses normally limits,
rather than expands, the insured's ability to obtain compensation. In
addition, an almost uniform practice of insurance companies has been
to issue coverage only in the statutory minimum.62 Often, this amount
is too low to provide adequate compensation. 63 Consequently, a myr-
iad of judicial decisions have been rendered in determining whether
insurance companies' attempts to prevent stacking can be reconciled
with the legislative purpose behind the applicable UM statutes.
Three different factual situations arise in which parties seek to
stack UM coverage. In one, passengers in a car struck by an uninsured
motorist attempt to void the excess-escape provision and stack the cov-
erage in their own policies when their damages exceed the amount of
the innocent driver's UM insurance.' Additionally, drivers injured in
one of several owned vehicles seek to increase their compensation by
voiding the pro-rata provision and stacking coverage under the UM
endorsements on separate policies. 65 The insureds in both these situa-
tions are attempting inter-policy stacking. In contrast, intra-policy
stacking occurs when the victim has one insurance policy covering sep-
arate vehicles. In such cases an attempt is made to avoid the pro-rata
provision and stack the coverage on each owned vehicle to increase
recovery.66 Courts have reacted differently to these attempts, a major-
ity consistently allowing stacking, others approving stacking only in
certain cases, and a minority totally prohibiting stacking UM policies
in violation of the other insurance clause.
4. States Prohibiting Stacking
A minority of jurisdictions hold that the other insurance clause is
valid and forbid the stacking of UM coverages. 67 The reasoning relied
on is that the purpose of the UM statute is to assure coverage in an
amount not less than the limits described in the financial responsibility
61. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 1.12.
62. Id § 1.13 (Supp. 1981).
63. 8C APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5103, at 515 (1981); see 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.38, at 24-127 (1979).
64. See 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.38, at 24-125 (1979); see,
e, Darrah v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 259 Cal. App. 2d 243, 66 Cal. Rptr.
374 (1968); Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d
315 (1979); Thurman v. Signal Ins. Co., 260 Or. 524, 491 P.2d 1002 (1971).
65. Eg., Kozak v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch., 79 Mich. App. 777, 262
N.W.2d 904 (1977); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207
N.W.2d 348 (1973); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Volkmann, 54 Ohio St. 2d 58, 374
N.E.2d 1258 (1978),
66. Eg., Curran v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 393 F. Supp. 712 (D. Alaska 1975); Indi-
ana Ins. Co. v. Ivers, 395 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Westchester Fire Ins.
Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
67. See WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.59, at 198-200 (Supp. 1981).
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law.6 8 Because UM coverage is only intended to place the insured in
substantially the same position he would occupy if he were injured by a
tort-feasor with the minimum statutory amount of coverage,69 courts in
these jurisdictions believe that allowing the victim to stack would pro-
vide him with more than the legislature intended.7"
The anti-stacking view was first enunciated in Burcham v. Farmer's
Insurance Exchange. 71 In that case, a passenger in a car struck by an
uninsured motorist sought to stack the coverage in his father's separate
policies with that in the primary72 policy. The court denied the at-
tempt, holding that the provisions of the other insurance clause should
be given effect. 7 The court stated, "To disregard the provisions of both
policies and to allow [the] plaintiff to collect to the extent of the policy
limit of each policy .. .is .. .absurd in the face of positive policy
limitations."74
In Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 75 decided af-
ter states began to pass mandatory UM statutes, 76 the Appellate Court
of Illinois refused to allow inter-policy stacking. Since the primary pol-
icy provided the minimum coverage mandated by statute, stacking was
precluded.77 Moreover, the court believed that other insurance clauses
operate to prevent stacking even if the victim is unable to recover the
entire statutory minimum under a primary policy.
7 8
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has also concluded that the
legislature has prohibited stacking.7 9 In Yarmuth v. Government Em-
68. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269, 273, 475 P.2d 253, 257 (1970),
cited with approval in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Herron, 123 Ariz. 315,
318, 599 P.2d 768, 770 (1979); Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal. v.
Alcivar, 95 Cal. App. 3d 252, 269, 156 Cal. Rptr. 914, 923 (1979); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 426 A.2d 822, 826 (Del. 1981); Lyon v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 310, 315, 480 P.2d 739, 742 (1971) (quoting An-
not., 28 A.L.R.3d 551, 554 (1969)).
69. See Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 310, 315, 480 P.2d 739,
742 (1971) (quoting Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551, 554 (1969)).
70. See, e.g., Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal. v. Alcivar, 95 Cal.
App. 3d 252, 268, 156 Cal. Rptr. 914, 923 (1979).
71. 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963); see 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 24.39[l], at 24-131 (1979).
72. See supra note 59.
73. Burcham v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 75-76, 121 N.W.2d 500, 503 (1963).
74. Id. The holding was consistent with most of the decisions rendered during this
time. Courts generally upheld the validity of the other insurance clause due to the
clear contractual language used in the policy. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 24.38, at 24-127 (1979). Today, many courts invalidate the clause
relying on the public policy of adequate recovery for every wrong. Id
75. 60 Ill. App. 3d 894, 377 N.E.2d 62 (1978).
76. Often, after a state adopted a UM statute courts would allow stacking when prior
to adoption they would prohibit it. See WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.59, at 107.
77. Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898-99, 377
N.E.2d 62, 65 (1978).
78. Id
79. Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979).
Some state statutes specifically allow insurance companies to include clauses in
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ployees Insurance Co., 80 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland certified to the State's court of appeals the question
whether Maryland law prohibited stacking.8 The facts disclose that an
uninsured tractor trailer collided with a car owned by Motorola and
driven by its employee, Starr.82 As a result, three members of the Starr
family were killed. In an attempt to stack the UM coverage in Starr's
personal policy with that of the employer, the representatives of the
decedents' estates argued that the other insurance clause in Starr's pol-
icy was void because it conflicted with the legislative intent behind
Maryland's UM statute. The personal representatives believed that the
intent required every policy to cover vehicles in the statutory mini-
mum.83 It was therefore asserted that enforcement of the clause would
defeat the purpose of the statute by exempting certain companies from
providing the required coverage. 84 Additionally, the personal repre-
sentatives argued that since they were not seeking duplicative recovery,
but merely indemnity for injuries sustained, Maryland's duplication of
benefits statute85 was inapplicable.8 6
In Yarmuth, the court of appeals held that other insurance clauses
their policies that prevent stacking. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(E)
(Page Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.030(6) (Supp. 1982).
80. 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979).
81. The certified questions were:
(1) May an insurance company, under Maryland law, include a provi-
sion in an automobile insurance policy which would prohibit the recov-
ery of uninsured motorist benefits under that policy where the insured's
claim admittedly exceeds $40,000 and where the insured has already re-
covered the sum of $40,000 under the uninsured motorist coverage pro-
vided by another insurance policy?
(2) Does § 543(a) of Art. 48A, Ann. Code of Md., prohibit the recovery
by an insured of uninsured motorist benefits under one policy where the
insured's claim admittedly exceeds $40,000 and where the insured has
already recovered the sum of $40,000 under the uninsured motorist cov-
erage of another insurance policy?
Id at 257, 407 A.2d at 316.
82. Id at 258-59, 407 A.2d at 316.
83. Id at 260, 407 A.2d at 317.
84. Id at 261, 407 A.2d at 317.
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543 (1979) (prevents recovery of personal injury pro-
tection (PIP) benefits or UM benefits on either a duplicative or supplemental
basis).
86. Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 261, 407 A.2d 315, 318
(1979). The representatives of the estates were relying on the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland's decision in Langston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 40 Md. App. 414,
392 A.2d 561 (1978), questioned in Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979). In Langston the court allowed what was in
effect inter-policy stacking by interpreting section 543(a) to prohibit payment in
full, twice, for the same claim (duplicative) or securing payment beyond what the
victim was legally entitled to recover (supplementary). Langston v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 40 Md. App. 414, 429-30, 392 A.2d 561, 569-70 (1978), questionedin Yarmuth
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979). Since the
victim was "stacking" so as to recover full damages, the court of special appeals
believed that it was not prohibited by section 543(a).
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in UM endorsements are enforceable and that the legislative intent, as
expressed in the applicable section of the Maryland Code8 7 and as in-
terpreted in a previous Maryland case, s precludes inter-policy stack-
ing.89 The court believed that the duplication of benefits statute is
more than a device to prevent recovery in excess of total damages.90
Rather, it concluded that the legislature had, by virtue of that statute,
implicitly approved the use of other insurance clauses. 91
B. Jurisdictions that Distinguish Between Types of Stacking
1. States Allowing Only Inter-Policy Stacking
A small number of jurisdictions distinguish between multi-vehicle
and separate policies, only allowing the insured to stack coverage
under separate policies.92 The rationale relied on for precluding intra-
87. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(a) (1979). This section states: "Notwith-
standing any other provision of this subtitle, no person shall recover benefits
under the coverages required in §§ 539 [personal injury protection or PIP] and
541 [uninsured motorist coverage] of this article from more than one motor vehi-
cle liability policy or insurer on either a duplicative or supplemental basis." Id
88. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976). The Benton
court denied the victim's attempt to stack personal injury protection (PIP) bene-
fits, holding that § 543(a) specified that recovery shall be under one but not both
policies. Id at 545, 365 A.2d at 1003. The court of appeals felt that the legislature
intended that the provisions of section 543(c), requiring payment of PIP by the
victim's own insurer if the victim is injured in a vehicle that has no coverage (as
mandated by section 539) would apply only when either the mandatory coverage
did not exist or did not encompass the circumstances of a particular accident. Id
at 546, 365 A.2d at 1004. Since the mandated coverage did exist in the primary
policy stacking was precluded. Id
PIP affords minimum medical, hospital, disability, and loss of income bene-
fits. It is payable without regard to fault, is mandatory, and requires coverage of
at least $2,500. Id at 543, 365 A.2d at 1002; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 539(a) (1979).
89. Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 263-64, 407 A.2d 315,
318-19 (1979).
90. Id at 264, 407 A.2d at 319. In making its decision, the court of appeals relied on
decisions in Iowa and Tennessee that interpreted statutes similar to section 543.
Those states had examined their statutes and found them to prohibit stacking.
See Westhoff v. American Interinsurance Exch., 250 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Iowa
1977). However, the Iowa statute was amended in 1980 to allow stacking. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 516A.2 (West Supp. 1982). The Tennessee decision was rendered in
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 519 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tenn. 1975). The
Tennessee court did say that absent TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1152 (codified today
at § 56-7-1205 (1980)) the better rule would be to allow stacking.
91. Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 264-65, 407 A.2d 315,
319 (1979); see also State Farm Mut. v. Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 392 A.2d
1114 (1978) (purpose of section 543(d) is to reduce benefits payable under PIP or
UM by any amount received under workmen's compensation); Oarr v. Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co., 39 Md. App. 122, 383 A.2d 1112 (1978) (precludes
stacking of multi-vehicle liability coverage).
92. See 8C APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5106, at 517 (1981). Compare Motor Club of
America Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 66 N.J. 277, 292-93, 330 A.2d 360, 369 (1974) (can
stack separate policies) and Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Volkmann, 54 Ohio St. 2d
58, 63, 374 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (1978) (same) with Allstate Ins. Co. v. McHugh, 124
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policy stacking is that the separate premiums paid do not create sepa-
rate coverages for each car. 9 Rather, they are for the additional risks
assumed by the insurance company.94 Theoretically, all the vehicles
could be on the road at the same time and involved in UM accidents
and all would be covered.95 This fact has been held to justify addi-
tional premiums and to defeat the argument they they amount to a
windfall for the insurance company.96
For example, in Indiana Insurance Co. v. Ivers, 97 the Indiana court
of appeals denied the insured's attempt at intra-policy stacking. Noting
that authority exists in Indiana recognizing inter-policy stacking, the
court felt that the situation was different when a single policy was in-
volved.9s The injured party argued that the limitation of liability
clause99 and the separability clause"° contained in her policy were am-
biguous and did not prevent her from stacking.' 0 ' The court pointed
out that the separability clause expressly exempted UM coverage and
held that no ambiguity existed in the limitation of liability clause.'02 In
addressing the victim's contention that it was unconscionable to allow
the insurance company to charge separate premiums and not be re-
quired to provide coverage for each, the court stated that separate pre-
miums were justified by the additional risk assumed by the insurer. 10 3
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court in Westchester Fire Insurance
Co. v. Tucker"° refused to allow an attempt at intra-policy stacking.
The court found nothing within the policy to indicate that the addi-
tional premiums charged for the extra vehicles multiplied the basic
N.J. Super. 105, 113, 304 A.2d 777, 781 (1973) (cannot stack multi-vehicle poli-
cies) and Weemhoff v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 41 Ohio St. 2d 231, 235, 325 N.E.2d
239, 241 (1975) (same).
93. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).
94. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Ivers, 395 N.E.2d 820, 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
95. Id
96. Id at 825.
97. 395 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
98. Id at 822-23.
99. See infra note 133.
100. A separability clause provides that when two or more automobiles are insured in
one policy the terms of the policy apply to each, thus creating separate policies of
insurance. Liddy v. Companion Ins. Co., 390 N.E.2d 1022, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979).
101. The victim argued that the fact that the vehicles were listed separately in the pol-
icy and separate premiums were assigned to each car created separate contracts of
insurance, while the insurance company argued that the limit of the liability
clause clarified any ambiguity and limited recovery to coverage on one car since
the UM provision did not contain a separability clause. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Ivers,
395 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). Today, many insurance companies
have removed the separability clause from their policies or have made it inappli-
cable to UM coverage to avoid potential conflicts. Comment, supra note 5, at 685-
86.
102. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Ivers, 395 N.E.2d 820, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
103. Id at 825. For a critique of the court's reliance on the additional risk theory, see
Comment, supra note 5, at 686-87.
104. 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
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coverage.' 05 The court did state, however, that stacking could occur
between separate policies. °6
2. States Refusing to Allow Passengers to Stack Drivers' Multi-
Vehicle Policies
UM policies usually make a distinction between classes of in-
sureds.'17 The policyholder and any relative occupying the same
household are in one class while passengers and those who use the car
with permission' °8 are in another. 1°9 Some courts, accepting this dis-
tinction, allow drivers to stack their own coverage in a multi-vehicle
policy, while refusing to allow passengers and permissive users to also
stack the driver's multi-vehicle coverage."10 The rationale for this dis-
tinction is that the owner of the vehicle pays the premiums and is,
therefore, the intended beneficiary of the policy."'Il Consequently, pas-
sengers and permissive users are limited to the coverage applicable to
the vehicle in which they are injured." 2 If available, the passenger and
permissive user, however, may stack their own coverage." 3
3. Stacking When Primary Coverage Exhausted
By virtue of Louisiana's 1977 amendments to its UM statute, the
state now prohibits both inter- and intra-policy stacking." 4 If the in-
sured is injured in a nonowned vehicle and exhausts the primary cover-
age, however, stacking is allowed.' 'I This is accomplished by defining
an insured vehicle as uninsured when coverage on it is less than the
amount of damages suffered by the insured and other passengers.' 16
Recent Louisiana decisions support this legislative distinction. In
105. Id at 684.
106. Id. at 685.
107. See 1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 293.
108. If the vehicle is used without permission the victim cannot recover. 6C AP-
PLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4364, at 167-69 (rev. Buckley ed. 1979); see Bond v. Penn-
sylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 289 Md. 379, 384-85, 424 A.2d 765, 768-69
(1981).
109. See 1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 293.
110. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832
(1972). Contra Estate of Calibuso v. Pacific Ins. Co., 62 Hawaii 424, 616 P.2d
1357 (1980).
UM statutes make no such distinction. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2
(West Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (Supp. 1982); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1983).
111. See Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 213 Va. 72, 76-77, 189 S.E.2d 832,
836 (1972).
112. Id
113. Id at 77, 189 S.E.2d at 836.
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406(D)(1)(c) (West 1978).
115. Id (D)(l)(c)(i), (ii).
116. Id (D)(2)(b); accord OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636(c) (West Supp. 1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.030(1) (Supp. 1982).
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Courville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 117 the court
permitted the insured to stack separate policies since he was injured in
a nonowned vehicle." " Two months later, in Branch v. O'Brien, I19 the
victim's attempt to stack coverage was denied because he was injured
in an owned vehicle.'20 Rather, the court allowed the victim to recover
under the policy with the highest limits.' 2 '
C. States Allowing Stacking
The majority of jurisdictions invalidate the other insurance clause
in UM policies and allow stacking, 122 usually for three reasons. First,
many courts believe that other insurance clauses violate the controlling
statute, which usually requires all policies to include UM insurance
and mentions a minimum but not a maximum amount of coverage.
23
Therefore, it is believed that any attempt, by use of other insurance
clauses, to set a maximum recovery for UM benefits must fail. 124 Sec-
ond, courts feel it is a violation of public policy not to assure adequate
compensation, believing that the insurance contract should be liberally
construed in light of the contracting parties' expectations and unequal
bargaining power. 2  Finally, it is considered inequitable to allow an
insurance company to collect premiums on separate policies and then
deny the multiple coverage that was purchased. 26
The landmark case allowing stacking is Bryant v. State Farm Mu-
tualAutomobile Insurance Co. 12 In that Virginia case, while driving a
117. 393 So. 2d 703 (La. 1981).
118. Id at 705.
119. 396 So. 2d 1372 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
120. Id at 1376.
121. Id at 1376-77. The Louisiana statute allows the insured to contract for any
amount of coverage as long as it is not less than the limits of bodily injury liability
provided by the policy. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406(D)(l)(a) (West 1978).
122. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.59, at 198-200 (Supp. 1981).
123. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606, 614, 243 So. 2d 736, 742 (1970);
Courtemanche v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Cas. Co., 118 N.H. 168, 171-73, 385 A.2d
105, 107-08 (1978); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 395-96,
241 A.2d 112, 115 (1968), cited with approval in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 481 Pa. 130, 140, 392 A.2d 281, 287 (1978).
124. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 395-96, 241 A.2d 112, 115-16
(1968), cited with approval in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Williams, 481 Pa.
130, 140, 392 A.2d 281, 287 (1978).
125. Curran v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 393 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D. Alaska 1975); Lam-
bert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260, 263 (Ala. 1976); Bose v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 210-11, 181 N.W.2d 839, 840-41 (1970); Pro-
tective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 217, 181 N.W.2d 835, 837-38
(1970). See Kozak v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch., 79 Mich. App. 777,
784-86, 262 N.W.2d 904, 907 (1977) (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
126. See Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 792-93, 457 P.2d 34, 41-42
(1969); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d 348,
351-52 (1973); Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 217, 181
N.W.2d 835, 837-38 (1970).
127. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
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truck owned by his father, the insured was struck by an uninsured mo-
torist. The victim sought to stack his own insurance and that covering
the truck. The supreme court of that state held that the victim could
recover under the UM provisions of both policies up to the extent of his
damages. 28 The opinion cited a number of prior UM cases to establish
the rule that the state's UM statute controls, and any provisions in an
insurance policy that conflict with it are void.' 2 9 The victim's policy
provided that the insured would be paid only the amount by which its
limits exceeded the limits in the primary policy. Since the statute re-
quired that the insured recover all sums he was legally entitled to, the
court held that the policy provision was unenforceable. 30
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court in Davis v. Hughes al-
lowed a victim to stack coverage on both cars included in her multi-
vehicle policy and also that of a second policy owned by her son-in-
law. The insurer, conceding that Kansas had generally allowed stack-
ing when separate policies were involved, noted that no Kansas appel-
late court had yet decided whether stacking was permitted on a multi-
vehicle policy.' 32 The insurer relied on a limitation of liability
clause "'33 in the multi-vehicle policy to confine the UM coverage to that
applicable to one car and prevent stacking. The court instead agreed
with the Florida Supreme Court in Tucker v. Government Employees
Insurance Co., 13 which stated:
It is an anomaly to contend that if two automobiles are com-
bined in the coverage of one . . . liability insurance policy,
with uninsured motorist protection added that an exclusion
128. Id at 901-02, 140 S.E.2d at 820. The court expressed its disagreement with a prior
federal court decision in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770, 773 (4th
Cir. 1963) that, in interpreting Virginia law, refused to allow stacking. Bryant v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 902, 140 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1965).
129. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 900, 140 S.E.2d 817, 819
(1965). The latest Virginia court to consider stacking held that an insured can be
prevented from stacking by "clear and unambiguous language ... on the face of
the policy." Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 970, 275 S.E.2d 625,
627 (1981).
130. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 901, 140 S.E.2d 817, 820
(1965).
131. 229 Kan. 91, 622 P.2d 641 (1981).
132. Id at 94, 622 P.2d at 644.
133. Id The typical limit of liability clause states that:
The limit of liability for family protection coverage stated in the declara-
tions as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's liabil-
ity for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services,
because of bodily injuries sustained by one person as a result of any one
accident and, subject to the above provision respecting each person; the
limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to "each acci-
dent" is the total limit of the company's liability for all damages, includ-
ing damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injuries
sustained by two or more persons as a result of any one accident.
1966 STANDARD FORM, reprinted in WIDISS, supra note 2, app. A. 1, at 293.
134. 288 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1973).
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. . . may be validly inserted, but that if a separate policy cov-
ered each automobile such exclusion is invalid. The mere
form of a policy - a combination coverage - should not be
the predicate for an exclusion of additional coverage.' 35
Noting that it had repeatedly held that the UM statute was to be liber-
ally construed, 136 the Kansas court stated that insurance policy provi-
sions purporting to limit or dilute the state's broad, unqualified UM
statute are unenforceable. 37 In view of the separate premium paid, the
court concluded that whether coverage was in one or two policies
should have no bearing on the issue. 131
Some states have modified their previously anti-stacking legisla-
tion. For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Kokay v. South Caro-
lina Insurance Co. 131 construed what was known as an anti-stacking
statute' 4° to allow inter-policy stacking when applicable policies cov-
ered different named insureds. 4' If the policy was a multi-vehicle one
or if the insured had several separate policies in his name, he was lim-
ited to the coverage applicable to any one vehicle. 42 However, the
statute was later amended so as to specifically exclude UM coverage
from its anti-stacking provisions. 143 Consequently, it would appear
that policies executed after the amendment will be subject to stacking
whether issued to different named insureds or not. 144
Similarly, amendments to the Wisconsin UM statute results in
voiding other insurance clauses that operated to reduce liability below
the actual amount of the victim's damages or the total indemnification
promised by the policy, whichever is less.145 Prior to 1975, the Wiscon-
135. Davis v. Hughes, 229 Kan. 91, 98, 622 P.2d 641, 647-48 (1981) (quoting Tucker v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973)).
136. Davis v. Hughes, 229 Kan. 91, 96, 622 P.2d 641, 646 (1981).
137. Id at 98, 622 P.2d at 646-47.
138. Id at 98, 622 P.2d at 648. This rationale has not been followed in other jurisdic-
tions. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
139. 380 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1980), af'd, 398 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1981).
140. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4132 (West 1977), now codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.4132 (West Supp. 1982).
141. Kokay v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 489, 491-92 (Fla. 1980), afl'd, 398
So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1981). The insured son was covered by separate policies issued
to his mother and father and was allowed to stack. 380 So. 2d at 490.
142. 380 So. 2d at 491-92. The state's supreme court expressed its disagreement with
the district court of appeals' decision in McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 366 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), which interpreted Florida's
UM statute to prevent all stacking. Kokay v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d
489, 491 (Fla. 1980), aft'd, 398 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1981).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4132 (West Supp. 1982).
144. The issue of whether amendments to a UM statute are applicable to policies is-
sued before the amendment has been decided differently among the states. Com-
pare Thibodeaux v. Oliver, 394 So. 2d 684, 686-87 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (law in
force on date of accident controls as long as no change in terms and conditions of
policy occurs) with McKinley v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 1269,
1270 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (law in force at time policy issued controls).
145. Landvatter v. Globe Sec. Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 21, 26, 300 N.W.2d 875, 878, cert.
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sin Supreme Court had consistently enforced other insurance
clauses. 146
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR ADEQUATE COMPENSATION
By providing for mandatory automobile insurance, unsatisfied
claim and judgment funds, and uninsured motorist coverage, states
have made great progress towards guaranteeing compensation to vic-
tims of uninsured motorist accidents. Regardless of these efforts, how-
ever, circumstances still exist that may decrease or eliminate the
compensation that the injured party receives.'47 Therefore, many juris-
dictions have gone even further by allowing a person insured under
more than one UM policy to stack coverage when necessary.' 48 Al-
though the availability of stacking normally inflates the cost of policy
premiums, due to the insurer's added risk of liability, the greater assur-
ance of adequate compensation to a potential victim justifies these ad-
ditional costs.
A distinction should be drawn, however, between stacking of
multi-vehicle and separate policies. The better rule only allows inter-
policy stacking because the insurance company is merely required to
pay what each individual policy promises in return for separate premi-
ums paid. The public policy behind UM insurance is defeated when
the insurer is able to avoid liability merely because other policies cover
the victim.'49 On the other hand, intra-policy stacking should be de-
nied and coverage limited to that applicable to one vehicle, because
that is all the policy promises. 50 To allow intra-policy stacking is un-
fair to the insurance company because liability would be increased and
the company would be unable to clearly assess the risk so as to reflect it
in the price of the premium."'
In jurisdictions that refuse to allow stacking, alternate steps could
be taken to help assure more compensation. Legislatures could not
only mandate that all liability policies contain UM provisions but also
increase the minimum statutory amount for UM coverage.' 52 This
would increase compensation, because inflation in the last decade has
denied, id at 23 n.1, 300 N.W.2d at 876 n.I (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). See WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 631.43(1) (West 1980).
146. See, e.g., Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 567, 217 N.W.2d
670, 674 (1974).
147. See supra notes 7-30 and accompanying text.
148. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 2.59 at 198-201 (Supp. 1981).
149. 8C APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5101, at 451-52 (1981).
150. Id at 451.
151. Id at 499.
152. The reason for most UM litigation today is the failure of insurance companies
and legislatures to require additional coverage. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABIL-
ITY INSURANCE § 24.38, at 24-127 (1979). In addition, the practice of a majority
of states in allowing insureds to reject UM coverage altogether defeats the purpose
of such coverage. Id § 24.11, at 24-27.
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transformed small losses into large ones, 15 3 without adding too much to
the price of the individual policy.' 54 The need for a higher statutory
minimum is clear when the practices of insurance companies are ex-
amined. When consumers go comparison shopping for insurance, few
companies will quote a price that includes coverage beyond the statu-
tory minimum or else risk losing business. 5 ' Often the policy price is
spoken of in a lump sum total, possibly omitting the information that
increased UM coverage is available since it will add to the policy's
cost.' 56 In addition, by precluding the insured's option to reject UM
coverage, all drivers would be entitled to at least some indemnification.
Moreover, since the chances of being involved in an accident with
an uninsured motorist are not remote, 157 both states and insurance
companies have a responsibility to educate the public as to the nature
of, and necessity for, increased UM coverage.' 58 For example, the
General Assembly of Maryland recently amended the state's UM stat-
ute to enable insureds to contract for coverage above the statutory min-
imum if the amount does not exceed the policy's liability coverage. 59
Increased UM coverage is optional, however, and the legislature's ef-
forts to protect its citizens may be meaningless if the public is unin-
formed as to the importance of exercising that option.
State legislatures can aid in increasing compensation by mandat-
ing that insurance policy provisions be made more understandable.
This can be done by giving specific examples of simplified language to
be used in standard policy clauses. 6 ° Only when the policyholder is
fully informed about the extent of the coverage, including exclusions
153. Comment, supra note 5, at 675; see 8C APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5103, at 515(1981).
154. For example, the price in Maryland for the minimum statutory amount (20/40)
offered by Allstate is $7.00 per car per six months. For 50/100 coverage the price
is $9.10 per car per six months. For 100/300 it is $13.50 per car per six months.
Telephone interview with John Lissau, Authorized Insurance Agent with Allstate
Indemnity Co. (December 15, 1982).
155. Id
156. Id Of course this practice depends on the individual client. Often clients will
want maximum protection for their families and increased UM coverage would be
recommended. Id
157. Only half of the states require automobile liability insurance. 6B APPLEMAN,
supra note 3, § 4299, at 300-01 (rev. Buckley ed. 1979). In a 1977 report prepared
for the Motor Vehicle Administration it was estimated that on any given day 2.8%
of Maryland drivers are uninsured. S. Versace, The Nature and Extent of the
Uninsured Motorist Problem in Maryland 32 (August 1977) (available from the
Motor Vehicles Administration).
158. This responsibility is even more crucial in states that give the insured the option to
reject coverage. For example, while West Virginia does make UM insurance op-
tional, it requires the insured to sign a letter that states that the commissioner of
motor vehicles has determined that UM insurance is important in light of the
number of uninsured vehicles on state roads. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1982).
159. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (Supp. 1982).
160. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 743.792 (1981) (gives suggestions for policy language,
but does not mandate that language be utilized).
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and limitations, will he be able to make an intelligent choice as to the
amount of additional coverage that will sufficiently meet his needs. By
utilizing complex and confusing policy language,' 6' insurance compa-
nies make it virtually impossible for the average insured to know what
his premiums buy.'
62
V. CONCLUSION
Either by statute or judicial decision, every state has indicated an
intent to provide compensation to victims of uninsured motorist acci-
dents. By allowing stacking in various types of situations, the majority
of states have made great strides towards securing adequate indemnifi-
cation. A minority of jurisdictions, including Maryland, refuse to per-
mit stacking. Rather, these states often allow the insured to contract
for increased coverage and define as uninsured a motorist whose liabil-
ity coverage is less than the victim's UM coverage. Further steps, how-
ever, can be taken. By increasing the statutory minimum amount of
UM coverage, eliminating the option to reject coverage, educating the
public as to the nature of UM benefits, and simplifying policy provi-
sions, states and insurance companies can fulfill the purpose of UM
insurance and assure more adequate compensation to innocent victims
of uninsured motorist accidents.
Donna M Maag
161. Note, Intra-Policy Stacking of Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments Cover-
ages.- To Be or Not to Be, 22 S.D.L. REv. 349, 357 (1977).
162. Comment, supra note 5, at 691-93. See OR. REV. STAT. § 743.792 (1981) for an
example.
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